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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
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INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
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ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
a National Association, 
Defendant and 
Respondent, 
FRANKLIN D. JOHNSON and 
KATHLEEN JOHNSON, his wife; 
GLENDON E . JOHNSON and 
BOBETTE JOHNSON, his wife; 
CLIFTON I. JOHNSON; JOHNSON 
LAND COMPANY, a partnership; 
and BAR 70 RANCHES, INC. , a 
Nevada corporation, 
Third Party and 
Additional Party 
Defendants . 
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
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Salt Lake City, utah 84102 
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No. 17187 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-appellant United American Life has reargued all of the facts 
as though the trial court found in its favor, to-wit: that there was an agreement 
made by Wayne Hintze for and on behalf of Zions First National Bank (herein 
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"Bank") that it would agree to release its Trust Deed lien on the Bar-7o Ranch fr, 
$50, 000. 00 when the unpaid balance on the loan was $150, 000. 00. The Court, I 
after submission of Findings of Fact in May CR .132) , Objections to Findings of 
Fact filed by appellant CR .148) , then final Amended Findings of Fact, signed OVf: 
plaintiff's objections on June 17, 1980 CR .142-147) , found that there was no 
agreement, no meeting of the minds; that the only agreement was that the Bank 1 
would release its Trust Deed lien only in the event it received payment in full. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On November 13, 1968, Bar 70 Ranches, Inc., a Nevada corporatj 
and Franklin D. Johnson, Glendon E. Johnson and Clifton I. Johnson borrowed&.: 
sum of $150, 000. 00 from Zions First National Bank, which loan was secured by' 
Trust Deed constituting a first lien on real estate in Grand County, Utah (hereir 
I 
called the "Bar 70 Ranches" and more particularly described in the Trust Deed. 1 
Exhibit 4), together with all water rights, including the certificates and applicat1 
of appropriation as described in the Trust Deed . 
,I 
2. The loan was also made upon the parties executing a Purchase"': 
Sale Agreement dated November 18, 1968, whereby United American Life InsurfilJ 
Company of Denver, Colorado (herein called "United American Life"), agreed tc 
I 
purchase the loan from the Bank on November l, 1970. The commitment of Unite:; 
American Life was extended for another 12 months by letter dated March 9, 1971 
3. On November 24, 1971, the Purchase and Sale Agreement where''] 
I 
United American Life agreed to purchase the loan was substituted by a Purcha51 
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and Sale Agreement executed by Howard Life Insurance Company, a Colorado 
corporation. The balance on the loan still remained at $150, 000. oo. 
4. In April, 1973, and August, 1973, the borrower executed 
Extension and Modification Agreements which changed the rate of interest and 
extended the time of payment until July l, 1978, when the entire balance was to 
become due and payable. 
5. Commencing August 6, 1973, and continuing through December 10, 
1973, Franklin D. Johnson, the principal borrower, and Wayne s. Hintze, Senior 
Vice President of Zions First National Bank, exchanged correspondence regarding 
payment of $75 ,000. 00 on the loan and amortizing the balance of $75 ,000. 00 over a 
five-year period. On December 10, 1973, Franklin D. Johnson visited Wayne S. 
Hintze in his office, and Mr. Hintze made a memorandum of their discussions, 
which reads as follows: 
Today Mr. Franklin Johnson indicated that he would be able 
to pay $75 ,000 on the principal of the subject loan reducing 
it to $75, 000, that then he would ask that the balance of the 
$75 ,000 be taken over by our Commercial Loan Department 
with the understanding that they would pay $25, 000 within 
30 days and the balance of $50 ,000 within a 90-day period on 
a personal loan to he and Glendon Johnson. 
/s/ Wayne S. Hintze, Vice President 
(Exhibit 41) 
Mr. Hintze agreed that Zions First National Bank would release its Trust Deed lien 
on the Bar 70 Ranches property when and if the Bank received full payment. 
6. Sometime in December, 1973, Mr. Franklin D. Johnson and United 
American Life agreed to a refinancing package wherein United American Life agreed 
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to advance an additional $185 ,000.00 in addition to a prior loan of $675 ,OOO.Oow
1 
it had with Johnson Land Company on property known as the East Oaks Compan,; 
Weber County, Utah, provided it be given additional collateral on three parcels· 
property, including a first lien on the Bar 70 Ranches property. In January, H:i 
United American Life mailed a check of $152, 816. 98 to Title Insurance Agency oq 
Lake City, Utah, with instructions to pay $50, 000. 00 to Zions First National Bani 
By letter dated January 2, 197 4, United American Life advised Title Insurance , 
Agency that " ... there is a lien due to Zions First National Bank in the amount·! 
$150, 000. 00. It is understood that this lien may be released upon payment of 
$50 ,000. 00 to the Zions First National Bank." On January 23, 197 4, a Trust De~ 
executed by Glendon E. Johnson, Franklin D. Johnson and their wives to United 
American Life covering the Bar 70 Ranches property in Grand County, utah, w~ 
recorded by Title Insurance Agency acting for and on behalf of United American ! 
I 
Life. The Trust Deed was dated December 28, 1973. Title Insurance Agency wr,:i 
a title insurance policy insuring that the Trust Deed lien of United American Lif1 
was a first lien upon said property, which title policy was effective January 23.; 
1974. 
7. On January 25, 1974, Title Insurance Agency drew a check inti' 
sum of $50 ,000. 00 payable to Zions First National Bank, which contained the 
following language on the voucher portion of the check: 
Printed: Attached check is in settlement of accounts 
listed hereon, before depositing detach this 
DUPLICATE VOUCHER and retain for your 
records . If not correct , return . 
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Typewritten: Payment in full of Trust Deed dated 
November 19, 1968, executed by Bar 70 
Ranches, Inc. , recorded November 20, 1968, 
as Entry No. , in Book 170, Pages 
198-200. 
At an unknown date subsequent to January 25, 1974, Mr. George Robinson of 
Title Insurance Agency went to the office of Wayne S. Hintze at Zions First National 
Bank, Head Office, One South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, and delivered 
said check either to Mr. Hintze or his secretary stating that this was for the Johnson 
deal. There was no accompanying letter with the check, nor any request made to 
Mr. Wayne Hintze to deliver a reconveyance of the Trust Deed of Zions First 
National Bank against the property. 
8. Wayne S. Hintze examined the check but neglected to note at that 
time the language contained in the voucher portion of the check. He was surprised 
the check was for $50,000.00 instead of $75,000.00 which was discussed with 
Franklin D. Johnson on December 10, 1973. Mr. Hintze instructed his subordinates 
to hold the check and wait and see if Franklin D. Johnson brought in additional 
funds. 
9. The check for $50, 000. 00 was deposited by mistake by some person 
other than Wayne S. Hintze, acting for the Bank on March 1, 1974, with a stamped 
endorsement and no personal endorsement on the back . 
10. On June 12, 1974, an additional $25,000.00 was paid by Franklin D. 
Johnson, which payment was applied on the loan. 
11. The Court finds that there was no meeting of the minds between 
Franklin D. Johnson and Wayne S. Hintze that the Trust Deed would be reconveyed 
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for the sum of $50, 000. 00 or for the sum of $75, 000. 00; that Mr. Hintze at all tirni 
was only willing to reconvey the Trust Deed lien with the understanding that thi 
real estate loan of $150, 000. 00 would be paid in full. 
12. On December 21, 1976, Johnson Land Company by Franklin D. ' 
Johnson conveyed the Bar 70 Ranches property to United American Life, which 
Warranty Deed was recorded January 4, 1977. On said date the principal balanc1, 
owing by Johnson to Zions First National Bank was the sum of $83, 906. 23. The 
Warranty Deed did not refer to or except the prior Trust Deed lien of Zions First 
National Bank. On or about January 4, 1977, Title Insurance Agency wrote an 
owner's policy of title insurance insuring that United American Life owned the 
premises without reference to the existing Trust Deed lien of Zions First Nation~ 
Bank. 
13. On or about January 4, 1977, the officers and agents of Title 
I 
Insurance Agency knew that the Trust Deed lien of Zions First National Bank wa•, 
still of record but no written demand or request was made for the reconveyance' 
said Trust Deed lien. 
14. The loan became delinquent and on March 31, 1978, Zions Fir:!: 
National Bank recorded its Notice of Default against the Bar 70 Ranches propert:i. 
which foreclosure was halted by the Temporary Restraining Order applied forb< I 
United American Life and granted by this Court upon oral argument heard June ii, 
1978. The balance of $83, 906. 23 with accrued interest of $31, 850. 00 and late 
charges of $12, 515. 63 to the date of trial and the attorney's fees incurred to dal!~ 
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the sum of $8 ,200. 00 have not been paid. The Court finds that the amount of 
attorney's fees incurred to date are reasonable (R.142-146). 
The plaintiff states in its Brief that the loan was a problem loan, and 
argues that there should be some kind of an estoppel enforced in favor of the plain-
tiff and against the Bank. Contrary to plaintiff's assertions, the loan by the Bank 
was well-secured by 1,000 acres of land (Bar-70 Ranches on the Green River), 
plus 22 second feet of water (Certificate for 10 c .f .s.; Application of Appropriation 
for 12 c. f. s.) . (See Exhibit 4 and Tr. 31, 35.) The Bank had a first Trust Deed 
lien on collateral worth a great deal more in value than $150, 000. 00. The Bank did 
not want to foreclose, and Wayne Hintze testified that he was anxious if possible to 
help Mr. Johnson (Tr .149) . The agreement between the Bank and Frank Johnson 
was clearly set forth in five written exhibits, Nos. 34, 36, 37, 39 and 41. The 
background to these letters and the memorandum written by Hintze on December 10, 
1973, is that the loan for $150 ,000. 00 had been a two-year loan with no provisions 
for monthly amortization (Exhibit 3). From November, 1968, to March 1, 197 4 
(5-1/2 years), no principal reduction had been made on the loan (Tr.132). All 
that Frank Johnson had been able to do was to pay the interest on the loan. The 
loan by the Bank was originally based upon a Purchase and Sale Agreement by 
plaintiff to buy the loan from the Bank (Exhibit No. 5) . Plaintiff reneged on this 
commitment (Exhibit 18 ,20) -- "they had made so many commitments all over the 
western part of the United States that they were broke" (Tr.25). Then Frank 
Johnson bought a project known as the East Oaks building in the mouth of Ogden 
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Canyon from plaintiff (Tr. 48) because he was told that this would help him get 
some money to finance the Terracor development of Bloomington. Johnson couJc 
not make the payments to plaintiff on the East Oaks property, because the prope::, 
later purchased by Terracor in Stansbury (Tooele County) had turned out to be 
I 
very tough property, and United American had over-committed itself and couldr,, 
live up to any of its commitments (Tr. 50) . 
Frank Johnson testified as follows: 
Q. Now, I am aware -- isn't it a fact that there 
are mortgages finally on the Stansbury project that total 
$28 million? 
A. Oh, I'm sure there is. Yes. Well, I'm not 
positive. When I left Terracor -- when we reached a 
settlement in Terracor in 1972, at the end of '72, there 
was approximately $11 million that had been put into 
Stansbury. 
Q. And while Bloomington was a success, 
Stansbury turned out to be quite a disaster? 
A. Yes. People did not want to live there. 
Q. All right. Then wasn't it a fact that you also 
had some discussions with Wayne Hintze about how you 
were doing overall on these other projects? 
A. Yes, we did. 
Q. That Wayne Hintze knew that you were 
heavily involved in real estate development and had loans 
at many banks in many different insurance companies 
that you obtained through your brother , Glendon? 
A. That's right. I think Wayne was -- Yes. 
think that's right. (Tr. 42; emphasis added) 
It is clear from the evidence that Hintze knew that Frank Johnson 11 ' 
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very very heavily indebted on many loans at other banks and insurance companies. 
And Frank Johnson knew that Hintze knew of his financial predicament. Frank 
Johnson's financial difficulty and the Bank's knowledge of Frank's predicament 
is the reason that Frank did not ask for a reconveyance, without full payment on 
his Trust Deed Note, and why he never applied at the Commercial Loan Department 
of the Bank to obtain an unsecured loan. It is the reason why Wayne Hintze testi-
fied: "Q. But he needed the release then, did he not? A. Well, he couldn't get 
that because he hadn't paid the money. No way do we release when we've still got 
a loan outstanding" (Tr .162) . 
Thus, in August, 1973, Johnson wrote to Hintze that he was selling a 
piece of property in September so "we could reduce the amount owed on the Green 
River ranch by $75, 000. 00. We would then be able to make a pay-out on the ranch 
over a five year period" (Exhibit 34). No mention was made of any release of the 
Bank's Trust Deed lien on the Green River ranch. On the basis of this request 
Hintze agreed to release the commitment of Howard Life Insurance Company (Ex-
hibit 36) . This was a successive replacement agreement to buy the loan from the 
Bank (Exhibit 24). Johnson had procured the Howard Life commitment to buy the 
$150, 000. 00 loan at the Bank, after United American Life reneged and failed to 
perform on its original commitment (Exhibit 5) . Johnson replied to Hintze on 
October 30, 1973, that the sale of our Ogden property was not yet concluded 
(meaning East Oaks -- purchased from plaintiff) and asked for "an extension of 
the period of the time until December 7 to pay the remaining $75, 000. 00" (Exhibit 
37) . Hintze replied on November 14, 1973, that the Bank would agree to a 
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$75, 000. 00 principal reduction and then Frank "would start a regular monthly 
payment of $1, 594. 00 . . . This would then pay the loan in full within a five-y.1 
period after the $75, 000 has been applied." Thus, there were to letters writteq 
Johnson (Exhibits 34 and 37) and two letters written by Hintze (Exhibits 36 a~q 
none of which mentioned any release of the Bank's Trust Deed lien for partial p:;; 
ment only. All of the letters led up to the critical conference between Frank Jc~ 
and Wayne Hintze on December 10, 1973. 
Wayne Hintze made a memorandum of that conversation which is~ 
follows (Exhibit 41): 
MEMORANDUM 
December 10, 1973 
TO: FILE 
FROM: Wayne S. Hintze, Vice President 
SUBJECT: Bar 70 Ranches 
Today Mr. Franklin Johnson indicated that he would be able to 
pay $75 ,000 on the principle [sic] of the subject loan reducing , 
it to $75, 000, that then he would ask that the balance of the 
$75, 000 be taken over by our Commercial Loan Department with 
the understanding that they would pay $25 ,000 within 30 days ani I 
the balance of $50, 000 within a 90 day period on a personal loan j 
to he and Glendon Johnson. 
/s/ Wayne S. Hintze, Vice President 
The loan balance at that time was still $150, 000. 00. It is clear thi', 
Frank Johnson, by asking that the balance of $75 ,000. 00 be taken over by our~ 
Bank's) Commercial Loan Department was not requesting a release of the Tru::l 
lien from the Real Estate Doan department for less than full payment. The trii~ 
found: 
! 
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Mr. Hintze agreed that Zions First National Bank would release 
its Trust Deed lien on the Bar 70 Ranches property when and if 
the Bank received full payment. (Finding of Fact No. 5, R .144) 
Trial was seven years later in July, 1980. Memories had dimmed but 
not the content of letters and memos. Frank Johnson testified that plaintiff was be-
coming very edgy because they could see we had financial difficulties and were 
having a hard time paying (for the East Oaks property) (Tr.51), so Johnson and 
plaintiff worked out a deal to refinance the East Oaks project at the mouth of Ogden 
Canyon and give plaintiff additional collateral in a Sanpete County property, and 
in property called LaRue in Colorado, and they wanted a first mortgage on the, 
property at Green River, Utah (Tr. 51). Plaintiff wanted a first lien on the Bar 70 
Ranches ... and we agreed to try and get it for them (Tr. 52). See the details of 
this Loan Modification Agreement in Exhibit 44. Johnson stated on his direct exami-
nation that" ... the conversation (with Wayne Hintze) I think was ambiguous. 
That was what I stated and I cannot recall totally what Mr. Hintze stated" (Tr. 26) . 
Frank Johnson did not testify that he told anyone at the Title Insurance 
Agency that he had an agreement with the Bank that they would release the lien 
upon payment of $75, 000. 00 or $50, 000. 00, or any conversation at all. The title 
company did not offer testimony that Johnson told them the Bank would release its 
lien. The title company got their information from plaintiff in a letter dated 
January 2, 1974 (Exhibit 45), which states cryptically: 
... there is a lien due the Zions First National Bank in the 
amount of $150, 000. It is understood that this lien may be re-
leased upon payment of $50 ,000 to the Zions First National Bank. 
No one called or wrote to Wayne Hintze to confirm whether this was true or not. 
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The Trust Deed by Frank and Glendon Johnson to plaintiff to secure a new adv·~ 
of $185 ,000 .00 had already been executed on December 28, 1973 (Exhibit 43) 
The title company had letters confirming in writing their payment>i 
the Speicker property in Colorado (Exhibit 38) and wherein Richard Christens0l 
agreed to release the LaRue Colorado property upon receipt of $50, 000. 00 (Exkui 
40). Yet, Reese Howell, an attorney and title examiner for Title Insurance Agee~ 
testified that he thought he had called someone at the Bank; that "I would havq 
I have a letter from United American Life saying that the payoff to Zions First~,. 
tional Bank for reconveyance would be $50 ,000. Could you verify that figurefo 
please? That's what I would have requested" (Tr. 98). He couldn't rememberil 
he talked to, whether it was a man or a woman, and he understood banking wet 
enough that it takes someone really in charge of the entire department, not just. 
payoff clerk, to authorize the release of the Trust Deed for $50, 000. 00 where u• 
amount due is $150,000.00 (Tr.100). He did not think he talked to WayneHint1e. 
Mr. Howell testified: 
At that time I did not know there was any additional 
monies owed * * * There might very well be but I prob-
ably assumed it might have been a payoff in full (Tr .108). 
Title Insurance Agency recorded the Trust Deed from the Johnson;:! 
plaintiff on January 23, 1974, and Title Insurance Agency wrote a policy of title 
insurance on January 23, 1974, without showing the Trust Deed lien to theB31i 
(Tr.90). The check for $50,000.00 was dated January 25, 1974. Mr. George 
Robinson on an unknown date delivered the check to the office of Wayne Hintze:: 
the Bank. He thought he delivered it to Wayne Hintze, or to his secretary· 
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instructions would have been, "Give this to Wayne. This is the Frank Johnson 
check transaction that we were handling and Wayne knew all about it" (Tr .119). 
There was no written letter or instructions other than the notation on the voucher 
portion of the check (Exhibit 76): 
Payment in full of Trust Deed dated November 19, 1968, 
executed by Bar 70 Ranches, Inc. recorded November 20, 
1968, as Entry No. in Book 170, Pages 198-200. 
Our Order No. 33743. 
Wayne Hintze testified , and the trial court found that he examined 
the check but neglected to note at that time the language contained in the voucher 
portion of the check. He was surprised the check was for $50, 000. 00 instead of for 
$75,000.00 which was discussed with Franklin D. Johnson on December 10, 1973. 
Mr. Hintze instructed his subordinates to hold the check and wait and see if 
Franklin D. Johnson brought in additional funds. The check for $50, 000. 00 was 
deposited by mistake by some person other than Wayne S . Hintze , acting for the 
Bank on March 1, 197 4, with a stamped endorsement and no personal endorsement 
on the back. On June 12, 197 4, an additional $25, 000. 00 was paid by Franklin D. 
Johnson, which payment was applied on the loan (Findings of Fact No. 8, 9 and 
10; R .145) . 
The Court found that there was no meeting of the minds between 
Franklin D. Johnson and Wayne S. Hintze that the Trust Deed would be reconveyed 
for the sum of $50,000.00 or for the sum of $75,000.00; that Mr. Hintze at all times 
was only willing to reconvey the Trust Deed lien with the understanding that the 
real estate loan of $150, 000. 00 would be paid in full (Findings of Fact No. 11; R .145). j Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-14-
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT Ai'rn NO MEETING OF THE 
MINDS, NO CONSIDERATION PAID FOR At'ff RELEASE OF 
THE BA.t'\/K'S TRUST DEED SECURING A LIQUIDATED 
UNDISPUTED AMOUNT, HENCE NO ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION 
To state the plaintiff's case on appeal in its simplest terms, it is thi; 
Once the Bank cashed the check, which voucher portion stated "payment in full 
of Trust Deed ... " then there was a legal binding agreement for the Bank to 
reconvey its Trust Deed lien. This is claimed to be so notwithstanding the fact 
that Frank Johnson proposed that he pay the loan in full. When Frank Johnson 
proposed to Wayne Hintze " ... that he would be able to pay $75 ,000 on the 
principal of the subject loan reducing it to $75, 000, that then he would ask that~ 
balance of the $75 ,000 be taken over by our Commercial Loan Department 
. . . " (Exhibit 41) , he knew the difference between the real estate and commer~ 
loan departments of the Bank (Tr. 64). He knew that Wayne Hintze dealt in 
secured loans (Tr.65) in the Real Estate Loan Department of the Bank (Tr.10). 
Frank Johnson proposed his own method of full payment on the $150, 000. 00 Tru;; j 
Deed Note (Exhibit 41). 
This Court, as it stated in Tates, Inc. vs. Little American Refi~ 
Co., 535 P. 2d 1228, must assume that the trial court believed those aspects ofn' 
evidence which may be deemed to support his findings and judgment, citing 
Memmott vs. United States Fuel Co. , 22 Utah 2d 356, 453 P. 2d 155. In the 
instant case, the trial court found that Mr. Hintze at all times was only willing ti 
reconvey the Trust Deed lien with the understanding that the real estate loan oi 
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$150, 000. 00 would be paid in full CR .145); that there was no accord and satisfaction 
reached between Franklin D. Johnson or the agents of Title Insurance Agency with 
Wayne S. Hintze of the Bank (R .146). United American Life or Title In-
surance Agency never talked to or wrote to Wayne Hintze to tell him that this money 
was being paid by plaintiff. Hintze had no knowledge of the letter written by plain-
tiff to Alton Lund of Title Insurance Agency (Exhibit 45 , paragraph 4d.) , that it 
was plaintiff's understanding that the lien of $150, 000. 00 may be released upon pay-
ment of $50 ,000. 00 to the Bank. Wayne Hintze knew that the check was to apply on 
the Bar-70 Ranches loan because George Robinson, when he delivered the check co 
Hintze's office said, "This is the Frank Johnson check transaction that we were 
handling and Wayne knew all about it" (Tr .119). Johnson's letters in the Bank 
file told Mr. Hintze (Exhibit 37) about selling his Ogden property, and all that 
Hintze knew was that the payment was made by the title company, presumably as 
agent for Frank Johnson. There is no evidence that Hintze knew that the 
$50, 000. 00 came from the same United American Life that had reneged on the 
original agreement to purchase the loan from the Bank on the 1st day of November, 
1970 (Page 3 of Exhibit 5). Nobody claims they informed Mr. Hintze that United 
American Life was now trying to pay off the Bank in full, by payment of $50 ,000. 00. 
There is no evidence in the record to support the statement in Appellant's Brief at 
page 18 that Hintze "knew the check had been funded by United American Life 
. . . and that pursuant to its terms and his past business experience, United 
American Life required as a condition of the payment, Zions First National Bank's 
reconveyance of its Deed of Trust." No one from United American Life ever 
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appeared or testified at trial. It is now the owner of the property with an owm;, 
title insurance policy (Exhibit 66; Tr. 6; Tr. 68). Counsel for appellant stated 
his opening remarks that Chicago Title Insurance Company (the underwriter for 
Title Insurance Agency of Utah) is behind the plaintiff "this is where the moneyi; 
in this case, so to speak ... " (Tr. 6) . 
There was no agreement, no meeting of the minds; no accord and 
satisfaction. The trial court's findings are clearly sustained by the weight of 
the evidence. The plaintiff-appellant tries on appeal to convince the Supreme 
Court differently without arguing forthrightly that the findings are not supportec 
by the evidence . 
To constitute an accord and satisfaction, there must be an agreemen1 
and there must be consideration. In Tates, Inc. , supra, the Court stated: 
Ordinarily, the payment of part of a debt does not discharge 
it; and this is true even though the paying debtor exacts a 
promise that it will do so. The reason for this is that in 
making the part payment, the debtor is doing nothing more 
than he is legally obligated to do, and therefore he gives 
the creditor no consideration for the promise that the part 
payment will be accepted to discharge the entire debt. 
In Browning vs. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 94 Utah 532, 
72 P. 2d 1060, this court stated: 
There must be consideration for the agreement. Settlement 
of an unliquidated or disputed claim where the parties are 
apart in good faith presents such consideration. Where the 
claim is definite and no dispute but an admittance of its 
owing, the agreement to take a lesser amount even followed 
by satisfaction is not good unless attended by some con-
sideration. In this case we do not see the elements of an 
accord and satisfaction. 
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Here, there was no disagreement between Frank Johnson and the Bank 
that the debt was $150, 000. 00, and that the debt was secured by a first Trust 
Deed lien on the Bar-70 Ranches property (Exhibits 3 and 4). It was a liquidated 
debt, not disputed. The ranch with its appurtenant 22 second feet of water rights 
in the Green River (Tr. 35) was of great value. Appellant argues, without citing 
any evidence in the record, that the Bank was in a situation similar to that of 
Sugarhouse Finance Co. vs. Anderson, 610 P. 2d 1369. In the Sugarhouse case 
the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that there was an accord and 
satisfaction; that the acceptance of a check for $2, 200. 00 as full payment on a 
judgment originally for $2,423.86 plus interest, costs and attorney's fees known 
to have been obtained by Anderson's borrowing the money from a third party 
constituted consideration. The important distinction is that the parties had several 
meetings and conversations , all of which led to a clear agreement that Sugarhouse 
Finance would accept $2, 200. 00 in full satisfaction of the judgment. Anderson 
owned a 12-acre tract in Sevier County, Utah, jointly with another party which was 
otherwise encumbered such that he hoped to receive no more than $2, 000. 00 from 
the transaction (610 P. 2d at p .1371) . It was this uncertainty of being able to 
collect the difference between $2 ,200. 00 and $2 ,438. 86 that led the trial court 
and the Supreme Court to hold that consideration existed for the undisputed 
accord which was reached. The finance company clearly reneged on an agreement 
to accept $2, 200. 00, which Anderson borrowed from a third party. 
United American Life never pleaded any accord and satisfaction, 
nor did it plead any promissory estoppel in its Complaint (R .1) wherein the 
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Bank's Trust Deed sale was temporarily enjoined, nor in its Amended Compl~r 
(R, 79), nor in any Reply to the Bank's Counterclaim (R. 62). Normally, accorr 
and satisfaction is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded. Hintze vs 
-----c:. 
Seaich, 20 Utah 2d 275, 437 P .2d 202; Utah Rules of Civil Procedure B(c); ~ 
Financial Corp. vs. Build, Inc. , 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P. 2d 670. Even though pl~ 
tiff did not plead accord and satisfaction , it had the burden of proof, on this 
affirmative defense oto show all of the essential elements. There was no evider.<a 
produced by plaintiff to show that the value of the Bar 70 Ranch was less than 
$150, 000. 00; that the Bank was unsecured or uncertain at all of being able to 
collect in full by foreclosure of its first lien on the 1, 000 acres and 22 second feet 
of water rights . Wayne Hintze testified that he had no recollection of Fran¥. Johls 
saying he was having problems with United American Life (Tr .149); he was an~c 
if possible, to help Mr. Johnson (Tr .149). He wanted to avoid foreclosure, il~a 
sible (Tr.150). But the reason for this attitude was that he knew Frank Johnsci 
was in financial difficulty (Tr .152) and that foreclosure by the Bank would lik<li 
cause Johnson to lose the equity in the property which existed over and abovellil 
amount of the $150, 000. 00 first lien. It is absolutely untrue and completely lacJn 
in evidence for appellant to state that the Bank was in a precarious situation in 
collecting its loan by foreclosing on its collateral. Appellant filed its Notice 01 
Default against the property on March 30, 1978, setting forth the unpaid balance 
of $73 ,591. 87 (R .12) , giving credit to Johnson for the $75, 000. 00 which had b~a 
applied on the loan. 
When Hintze received the check for $50, 000. 00, he instructed h15 
ff. " 1 . . f h " (Tr 15~! o ice to ho d the check until Frank brought m the rest o t e money , Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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That's why the check was not cashed as soon as we received it" (Tr .155). The 
check dated January 25, 1974, was cashed March 1, 1974 (Tr.137). Mr. Hintze, 
on cross-examination by counsel for the appellant, stated: 
No way do we release when we've still got a loan 
outstanding (Tr .162) . 
* * * 
What would prohibit me on a 30-year mortgage saying 
"payment in full on a monthly statement," and the bank 
just automatically cashing the check. Does that mean 
I'm relieved from my mortgage? 
Q. Well, maybe. 
A. Well, I'll try it then. I'll try it and see. 
THE COURT: I don't think you'd get away with it. 
Mr. Garrett: No, I don't either. 
The Witness: I don't either. (Tr .164) 
Appellant submitted Objections to Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Request for Amendments (R .148), but appellant's request for amend-
ments made no suggestion of any way that the trial court could find that payment 
of $50, 000. 00 was consideration for release of the collateral security for 
$150,000.00. The suggestions in Appellant's Brief (second paragraph at page 25) 
that somehow there was consideration given to the Bank are ridiculous. 
The trial court concluded that there was no consideration given to 
the Bank to impose any obligation upon it to reconvey the Trust Deed lien upon 
payment of $50, 000. 00 only (R .147). 
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A review of the many Utah cases on accord and satisfaction (1) We 
show that somebody tried to back out of a definite deal. To enforce the agreemi:,
1 
against such party, there had to be a clear agreement and a consideration for 
such party giving up the balance of his payment. 
The following definition from Vol. 1, American Jurisprudence, 
Accord and Satisfaction, § l, Page 301, succinctly states the rule: 
To constitute an accord and satisfaction there must 
be an offer in full satisfaction of the obligation, accompanied 
by such acts and declarations as amount to a condition that 
if it is accepted, it is to be in full satisfaction, and the con-
dition must be such that the party to whom the offer is made 
is bound to understand that if he accepts it, he does so sub-
ject to the conditions imposed. 
If any businessman would reflect a moment on why would any bank 
release its collateral securing a loan of $150, 000. 00 upon payment of $50 ,OOU,i 
would seem necessary for a title company, or third party to telephone or write 
to the bank, and confirm such an agreement in writing. We are dealing in this 
case with a title company , and a bank, two competent capable business entitie: 
The entire difficulty with this case is that the title company wrote a title policy 
insuring that United American Life had a first lien upon the property (January~J 
1974) before it even issued the check (January 25, 1974) without any le:tteror 
written confirmation that the Bank would accept such an (unmade) proposal. The ti 
(1) Browning vs. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 94 Utah 532, 72 P .2d 
1060; Ralph A. Badger & Co. vs. Fidelity Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 94 Utah 97., 
75 P. 2d 669; Bennett vs. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., 18 utah 2d 186' 411 
P.2d 761; Hintze vs. Seaich, 20 utah 2d 275, 437 P.2d 202; Tate's, Inc.~ 
Little America Refining Co., 535 P. 2d 1228; Sugarhouse Finance co. v~ 
Anderson, 610 P. 2d 1369. 
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written confirmation that the Bank would accept such a dubious offer. The title 
company had represented Frank Johnson on all of his title work at Bloomington 
and Stansbury (Tr.54). By January, 1974, they had to know that Frank Johnson 
was in serious financial difficulty. The title company had in its file, letters in 
writing confirming that Frank Spiecker (Exhibit 38) and Richard Christensen 
for Capital Thrift and Loan would accept the payments of some $52 ,000 .00 and 
$50, 000. 00 respectively as full payment for their respective trust deeds. No ex-
planation has ever been given why the title company dealt so haphazardly with 
the Bank. It wasn't worth the time to write a letter; it wasn't worth the time for 
George Robinson, when he delivered the check, to wait and explain that the 
title company insisted upon obtaining a release of the Trust Deed on the Bar-70 
Ranches property, before the check could be cashed by the Bank. Had 
Mr. Robinson, or the title company, by letter, clearly insisted on a reconvey-
ance, Mr. Hintze testified that "I would have handed (the check) back to the 
man right then." Q: And said what? A: We will not accept it as full payment." 
(Tr .156) . 
Because the trial court found there was no accord and satisfaction, 
the statute of frauds, pleaded by the Bank was never reached as the decisive 
point of law in this case. The statute provides: 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. --No 
estate or interest in real property, other than leases for 
a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power 
over or concerning real property or in any manner relating 
thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered 
or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law , or 
by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party 
I 
I 
l.1 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-22-
creating, granting, assigning , surrendering or declaring 
the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by 
writing. (25-5-1 U .C .A. 1953) 
It is submitted that the statute of frauds requiring a deed or a 
mortgage creating an interest in real property to be in writing also requires 
with equal dignity the surrender of such mortgage, or trust deed to be in 
writing, subscribed by the party surrendering the same. The machine-stamped 
endorsement on the back of the check does not constitute a subscribing in writini 
by the party surrendering its interest in real property. See Conclusion of I.aw No.1. 
In all of the other cases cited by appellant, such as: Minnesota & 
Ontario Paper Co. vs. Register & Tribune Co., 219 N .W. 321; Appeal of 
Crockett, 154 Atl. 180; Richardson vs. Taylor, 60 Atl. 796, there was a letter 
written which clearly conveyed the intent that the check should not be cashed 
if the disputed amount involved were not determined to be paid and settled in fuli. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL AS TO FAILURE TO FIND ESTOPPEL 
SHOULD BE BARRED DUE TO PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE 
TO PLEAD THE SAME. 
Plaintiff United American Life is not the real party in interest in 
this suit. The title company and its underwriter is. By United American Life 
bringing suit, as the plaintiff, it was able to obtain judgment against Johnson 
Land Company, Franklin D. Johnson and Glendon E. Johnson, and their wives 
(R .152) , for all damages and indebtedness due to the breach of warranty in the 
Warranty Deed from Johnsons to the plaintiff on December 1, 1976 (Exhibit 661· 
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The Green River water rights were so valuable that plaintiff not only wanted a 
lien of $185, 000. 00 on the property (Exhibit 43) , but three years later it acquired 
the fee simple title. The title company , because they had issued their previous 
Trust Deed lien, then insured that plaintiff was the fee simple title owner, without 
exception as to the Bank's lien, in January, 1977 (Tr .114). 
The evidence is without dispute that the Bank made no 
representations to plaintiff or the title company that it would accept only $50, 000. 00 
and release its lien securing payment of $150 ,000. 00. United American Life had 
reneged and breached its commitment to purchase the loan from the Bank, when 
the loan was initially made (Exhibits 5, 18 and 20; Tr .25). The Bank had no 
knowledge that the $50,000.00 check (Exhibit 75) represented funds which were 
sent to the title company by plaintiff as a part of the refinancing deal . 
Plaintiff (not Frank Johnson) wanted to obtain the first lien on the Bar-70 Ranch 
property, and Frank Johnson "agreed to try and get it for them" (Tr. 52). 
Plaintiff knew very well that the Bank would not reconvey its 
$150, 000. 00 collateral for payment of $50, 000. 00 by them. So, plaintiff sent the 
money to the title company to see if $50, 000. 00 would pay off $150, 000. 00. With 
this history of plaintiff putting Frank Johnson on the spot to see if he could get 
a first lien for them, and the Bank going unsecured, it is galling for plaintiff-
appellant to state (at page 29) in its Brief: 
United American Life, as a third party, did rely upon 
Zions' acceptance of its funds and acquiescence in the 
terms under which the $50, 000 check was delivered. 
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This is the exact opposite of the truth, and testimony in this case. 
No estoppel was pleaded, which the trial court noted, at the conclusion of the tr·.~ 
(Tr .174). 
No representations were ever made by the Bank to the plaintiff. ni 
Bank didn't even know in January, 1974, that plaintiff was involved in the deal' 
The trial court stated " ... there's nothing in the evidence from which the Cou,1 
can find that the Bank was aware of the refinancing arrangements that Mr. John~ 
was making through United, or aware that the Title Insurance Agency was goinil 
be the disbursing agency and therefore that they misled anybody, knowing what 
the facts were. . . . There was no record that the bank had any knowledge in 
this, and therefore misleading based on the knowledge they had. . .. 
"There very might possibly be some estoppel provision come in if 
they suffered a loss as a result of somebody else's misconduct. But we can't get 
into that since Title Insurance Agency is not a party to this particular suit .. , 
(Tr .175). 
"So therefore the Court concludes this does not constitute a conditiCll 
delivery. Had it been shown that the Bank knew of this, was aware of it, lookea 
at it and said, 'All right. We'll take it then. Fine. We've got a conditional de-
livery.' But otherwise there's nothing in the evidence to show that that was 
brought to the attention of the authorities. Well, I don't want to speculate how 
it was done, because there is nothing in the evidence how it got in except it wa: 
done by mistake as far as the Bank was concerned" (Tr.176-179). The Court 
should read all of the trial court's remarks, which constitute his verbal findings 
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just the same as formal later written findings. Some of the remarks have been 
omitted for the sake of brevity. 
If the plaintiff, or the title company had sent a letter with the check, 
stating clearly their intent to Wayne Hintze, who they knew was the only officer 
of the Bank with authority to release the collateral, they would have immediately 
received their money back. As can be seen from Exhibits 17, 18, 19 and 20, the 
plaintiff had no compunction in writing directly to Mr. Hintze in 1971, when it 
came to a matter of informing the Bank that United American Life would not honor 
the commitment to purchase the loan. But, when the delicate task of getting the 
Bank to release for $50, 000. 00 came up , they were unwilling to telephone, write 
or approach Wayne Hintze directly. 
The money ($50,000.00) which was paid to the Bank was Frank 
Johnson's proceeds of the new loan refinance agreement made with plaintiff, pur-
suant to the Loan Modification Agreement (Exhibit 44) . The money did not belong 
to the title company, nor to United American Life. The argument concerning 
estoppel is made as though the title company has already sustained a loss because 
it parted with $50, 000. 00 of its own funds in reliance upon a promise to release, 
made by the Bank. This is not so. The loss to the title company is because it 
wrote a title policy first insuring that plaintiff had a first lien on the premises on 
January 23, 1974, then insuring that plaintiff was the owner of the property and 
that the Bank no longer had any lien thereon. 
If the title company had demanded the return of the money at any 
time , prior to suit, they would have received it, because the Bank still had a 
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first lien on sufficient valuable collateral to pay the loan. The Complaint did 
not seek return of the money, because had the Bank returned the money, the 
loan balance with accrued interest would have been that much more, and the 
Bank would have foreclosed its first lien. The money really belonged to Frank I 
Johnson, and he never demanded its return. i 
The plaintiff tried to pull a fast one on the Bank. The plaintiff haol 
reneged on its commitment to purchase this loan (Exhibits 18 and 20), as it hao1 
on many others, and it knew that its request for a reconveyance for 33% payment! 
would have been emphatically denied. Plaintiff may have known of the practic1 
of the title company in immediately issuing its title policies. Plaintiff's title 
policy was dated and issued January 23, 1974, two days before the check was 
issued. The check was not cashed until March 1, 197 4. 
When the title company insured that the plaintiff was the fee simpl< 
title owner in January, 1977, they were then ready to take the position in cour! 
that the Bank was not secured; that it had no lien. Still, there were no letters 
to the Bank advising it that any foreclosure would be resisted. Frank Johnson'i 
financial condition was steadily worsening, and the Bank's efforts at collectini 
on an unsecured debt would have been greatly impaired, but the title company 
waited to see if the Bank could collect. This failure to notify the Bank that it 
had lost its lien by cashing the check would have been met in court with a counil 
claim for damages, estoppel and waiver by the Bank against the title company, 
for the four years' delay and failure of the title company to demand the return 
of the money and notify the Bank of the title company's position. In the meann1e 
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(November 11, 1975), Frank Johnson was promising to make payment to the Bank 
" . . . on a negotiated sale on most of the ranch property and since they are selling 
to a co-op who are selling their interest on a share basis ... (Exhibit 63) . See 
also Exhibits 64, 65 and 67 which letters are all written as though the Bank was 
still a first lien holder on the Bar-70 Ranch. 
The overall result is that counsel for the Chicago Title Company 
chose not to make the title company the plaintiff in this suit. As stated above, 
plaintiff has judgment against the Johnsons, because of the Warranty Deed 
running to plaintiff. The Brief argues equitable or promissory estoppel when 
no representations or promises were made by the Bank, and when the matter 
was not pleaded or tried on that theory. 
There are no other facts relied upon to constitute estoppel, than in 
the argument that there was an accord and satisfaction. However, accord and 
satisfaction require an agreement, and consideration where there were none, 
whereas promissory estoppel is argued as though the element of a clear under-
standing and an agreement, and consideration (to-wit: the payment of the additional 
$100, 000. 00 plus interest) are not necessary. It would be a grave mistake to 
classify some of the Utah cases seeking the final satisfaction of the debt without 
full payment, under the legal doctrine of accord and satisfaction, and some cases 
with exactly the same facts under the heading of estoppel. Could you have a 
promissory estoppel or conditional delivery and acceptance of a check for 
$50, 000. 00 if the secured Trust Deed Note was $150 ,000. 00 and no consideration 
given for the release of collateral where the debt is liquidated and not in dispute? 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion , the law should place the burden on the debtor (or 
third party) seeking a full and complete satisfaction of a debt, a judgment, an 
I 
invoice or a trust deed for less than full payment by taking care to put in writini'' 
the complete accord and understanding of the parties with a signed acknowledge! 
ment by the creditor, as legally binding as a release agreement signed between I 
lawyers. The statute of frauds sought to achieve this when the creation or 
surrender of any interest in land was involved. 
This case was a factual dispute over whether or not an agreement 
had been reached, and whether or not any consideration was paid for the rele~' 
of a first lien securing $150, 000. 00 upon payment of $50, 000. 00. The trial court 
ruled against the plaintiff on all issues. The plaintiff-appellant has completely 
misstated the facts in its Brief on Appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GREENE, CALLISTER & NEBEKER 
Richard H. Nebeker 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent 
were mailed to Edward M. Garrett, attorney for plaintiff and appellant, 144 South 
500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and two copies were mailed to Franklin D. 
Johnson, attorney for third party and additional defendants, 79 South State #700, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this day of January, 1981. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
